

## A Distinction in Love

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Like digestion, love is not voluntary. We have very little direct control over who we love and how. Indeed, we often speak of love as a great force that pushes us around. We fall in and out of love, we are blinded and possessed by love, and our love may hold us hostage. Such descriptions bring to mind romantic love, but they apply to love between friends and family, too. Although we can put ourselves in situations that are likely to inspire or stifle our love, we cannot choose to love as we can choose to raise our hand: we cannot love at will.

And yet we are normally more intimately and directly accountable for our love than we are for our digestion. Our love is responsive to our beliefs about our beloveds, about ourselves, and about what we have reason to do, believe, desire, or shun. Sometimes a person's love may seem inappropriate, or misguided, and other times we may find the absence of love objectionable, as in the case of a parent who does not love his child. Even in the grip of love, we can still ask ourselves whether our love makes sense, whether it is right, whether we should give ourselves to it or resist it. It is in this sense that love—but not digestion—is rational: love reflects the agent's judgments about the world around her and may be criticized, endorsed, or disowned.

Nevertheless, the idea that love is rational gives rise to apparent puzzles. First, consider the many children that are in greater need of help than your own child. Is it not objectionable to favor your child over those other children, whose plight is more urgent? The equal moral worth of all persons seems to be in tension with the disproportionate attention and care we direct at our beloveds. This is the puzzle of *legitimate partiality* (section 1). Second, in loving a person we direct our attention and care to the particular person she actually is, not to some subset of her properties. And yet if love for a person is to be rationally justified, it must be justified on the basis of the beloved's properties. This gives rise to a puzzle about the *particularity of love* (section 2). Third, in loving a person

we experience many of our reactions to him or her as called for or required. And yet we may, at the same time, concede that we are not rationally required to love this person. How might love be both required and optional? This is a puzzle about the *necessity of love* (section 3).

The thesis of this essay is that distinguishing between two kinds of love-related reasons dispels the aforementioned puzzles. On the one side of the distinction in question there are reasons *to* love a person. These are reasons that justify, render appropriate, or make sense of a person's love for another and of actions done from love. On the other side of the distinction there are reasons *of* love for a person. These are reasons that we take ourselves to have insofar as we love a person, e.g., reasons to care about his or her mood, reasons to go hiking together, or reasons to carefully consider his or her opinion. I will argue that, in one way or another, the three puzzles arise from a failure to distinguish and understand the relation between reasons *to* love and reasons *of* love.

### 1. A Puzzle about Partiality

A court judge summons the next case. The defendant enters and stands before her, silently waiting his turn. As the judge raises her eyes from her papers, she recognizes the defendant as her son. The judge recuses herself from the case.

Surely, the judge realizes that she could not remain impartial while having her son as the defendant. Such inability would be sufficient to justify her decision to disqualify herself. But we can say something stronger. It might be argued that even if the judge were able to remain impartial, and treat her son as she would treat any defendant, being impartial toward her son would have been objectionable. So the judge's predicament is not merely one in which it is difficult, or impossible, to do what she ought to do, but one in which she appears to have conflicting responsibilities: being a good mother and being a good judge seem mutually exclusive in this scenario.

Perhaps in this story the conflict between partiality and impartiality may be resolved by the judge's recusal. But unlike the seat of a judge, which one may opt out of, the claims of morality and justice are unconditionally authoritative. We—mothers,

fathers, children, siblings, friends, and lovers—cannot relieve ourselves of our responsibilities as moral agents in the way the mother in our example relieves herself of her responsibilities as a judge. Thus, it might be thought, the conflict between morality and partiality cannot be resolved in the way that the judge's conflict is resolved.

Some have concluded from this conflict that, if partiality is ever to be justified, it must be justified by impartial moral considerations (Railton 1984, Baron 1991). Others have concluded that since partiality may be justified even when it conflicts with morality, we are sometimes justified in violating the demands of morality, at least as those demands are construed by contemporary moral theories (Stocker 1976, Williams 1981). But many philosophers argue that the problem at hand does not warrant such extreme conclusions: we can make room for legitimate partiality without grounding it in moral justifications and without restricting the decisive authority of morality (Kolodny 2003, Korsgaard 1996, Raz 1989, Scanlon 1998, Scheffler 2001, Scheffler 2010).<sup>1</sup>

The apparent conflict between morality and partiality arises because any plausible view of morality accepts the idea of moral equality, namely, “the idea that everyone counts morally, regardless of differences such as their race, their gender, and where they live” (Scanlon 2005, 3). When we are partial toward someone, we seem to violate this basic moral idea. The judge's son does not count more than any other defendant merely because he is her son.

But moral equality does not, by itself, preclude partiality. For morality certainly does not require that we make no distinctions between individuals. A person in dire need and a person who is sipping a daiquiri on the beach do not warrant the same moral response. While both persons are morally equal, it does not follow from this fact that we should treat them in the same way. Moral principles apply to everyone equally—they are

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<sup>1</sup> The idea that morality and partiality are independently authoritative and generally compatible may leave room for the possibility that there are irresolvable conflicts between them. Susan Wolf has argued this much in Wolf 1992.

universal in their application and general in their content—but they yield different verdicts, depending on the circumstances.<sup>2</sup>

Once we see that morality itself properly differentiates between persons on the basis of their features and their circumstance, and that this is perfectly compatible with—indeed, necessary for—moral equality, it becomes clear that the problem of legitimate partiality does not follow from the universality of morality, i.e., the fact that moral principles apply to everyone. Universality is compatible with differential treatment because universal principles prescribe actions based on relevant descriptions and have conditions of application that only some individuals satisfy.

If there is a conflict between morality and partiality it is not due to the fact that morality is universal; rather, it is due to the fact that some forms of partiality are morally objectionable. For example, it is arguable that discrimination on the basis of race or gender is objectionable because it is based on features of individuals that are not morally relevant. Similarly, when being partial toward one's friend or sibling is objectionable, this is because the fact that someone is my friend or sibling is not morally relevant to how I should treat him or her in the relevant circumstances. The judge, for example, would be wrong to acquit her son merely because he is her son. But this is a substantive claim about morality rather than a consequence of a fundamental conflict between morality and partiality.

Philosophers have tried to capture reasons of partiality in a way that makes their universality evident.<sup>3</sup> Just as every person counts morally, and therefore everyone has reason to help anyone in need, so every person may have reason to be mindful of his or

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<sup>2</sup> I take the distinction between universality and generality from Rawls. Rawls suggests that a principle is general if it can be formulated “without the use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions” and a principle is universal if it holds “for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons.” See Rawls 1971/1999, 131-133/113-115.

<sup>3</sup> I have in mind, in particular, the idea of agent-relative reasons, as developed by Thomas Nagel (1970, 47) and, later, by Derek Parfit (1984, 27) and Samuel Scheffler (1994). Agent-relative reasons are normally understood as reasons that contain an essential reference to the agent, as in the claim that everyone has a reason to console *his* or *her* friend. The distinction has also been criticized, for instance by Korsgaard (1993).

her son more than he or she is mindful of a passerby, a reason to help a friend more than a distant acquaintance, etc. Such reasons apply to all persons alike, but they issue different verdicts for different individuals depending on the relation a person bears to other individuals. Thus, while partiality involves special relations between persons, such relations are not special to specific persons but can be had by anyone and refer to anyone, at least in principle. As such, reasons of partiality are universal and compatible with the idea of moral equality.

However, the proposal that the reasons we have with regard to our loved ones are—like moral reasons—universal, may seem implausible. Indeed, the proposal seems to deny the very phenomenon that gave rise to the puzzle of legitimate partiality to begin with. When we love a person we normally respond to reasons that refer to this person as a particular, not to reasons that refer to the person's properties. For example, when my friend Terry tells me of her trouble, I take myself to have reason to offer her my advice, or to listen and console her. But my reason to do so is not that this is how one should respond to a friend in need; rather, it is that *Terry* is in need and this is how I should respond to *her*. If my reasons to advise, listen, and console Terry are universal, as the solution to the puzzle of legitimate partiality suggests, then there seems to be no room for the partiality characteristic of love.

To give another, subtler example, if the judge were to recuse herself upon seeing the defendant merely “because it is him” or “because it is Todd,” then her decision would not seem warranted. Indeed, her recusal would seem arbitrary, perhaps even unintelligible. There must be something *about* Todd, or about the circumstances more generally, that makes sense of, or justifies, the judge's decision to recuse upon seeing Todd in her courtroom. And, indeed, the judge's love for Todd, and the special reasons she has with regard to him, *can* be explained and made sense of: Todd, the defendant, is the judge's son. And yet it seems that the judge's initial surprise and distress upon seeing the defendant in her courtroom is best described as a response to the fact that the defendant is Todd, not as a response to the fact that the defendant is her son.

Thus, if the proposed solution to the puzzle of legitimate partiality is to be

plausible, we must show that it is compatible with love's partiality. Here we first arrive at the distinction that will reemerge throughout this paper: the distinction between reasons *of* love and reasons *to* love. Reasons *of* love are the reasons a lover takes him- or herself to have with regard to his or her beloved. Such are reasons to be mindful of the beloved, to act for the beloved's sake, to care for the beloved, but also reasons to be offended when the beloved disregards you, to feel implicated in the beloved's failures, and perhaps even reasons to assign greater epistemic weight to the beloved's beliefs.<sup>4</sup> Such reasons reflect the distinctive authority we attribute to our beloveds, their presence in our lives, and the consideration they seem to demand of us. Loving a person involves taking oneself to be responding to reasons *of* love with regard to him or her.

In contrast, reasons *to* love are given by the facts or features that make sense, justify, or require one's love for another individual. It is in light of a person's reasons *to* love that her reasons *of* love make sense to us. Examples of possible reasons to love are the beloved's qualities (Jollimore 2011); the kind of history one has with the beloved (Kolodny 2003); the fact that the beloved reciprocates one's love (Brown 1997); or the sheer fact of the beloved's personhood or humanity (Velleman 1999, Setiya 2014).

The puzzle of legitimate partiality gets a grip when we focus on reasons *of* love and neglect reasons *to* love. By themselves, reasons *of* love seem arbitrary, for they refer to the beloved without reference to the features that make him or her an appropriate object of love. But reasons *to* love do just that: they make sense of our love for a particular person and of our reasons with regard to him or her in particular. My reasons *of* love for Todd, for example, make sense in light of the fact that Todd is, say, very kind and wise (Jollimore); or in light of our relationship (Kolodny); because Todd reciprocates the attention I grant him (Brown); or because of Todd's personhood (Velleman). These different answers need not be mutually exclusive. That I have reasons of love with regard to Todd rather than with regard to the table might be explained by Todd's personhood, for example. But were I to explain why I have reasons of love with regard to Todd but not with regard to Terry, I might appeal to the fact that Todd and I have known each other since childhood whereas I only met Terry last week. Different specifications of

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<sup>4</sup> For an argument that friendship involves epistemic partiality, see Stroud 2006.

reasons *to* love assuage different worries about the arbitrariness of reasons *of* love.

Though we are often unsure how to adjudicate the claims of love and morality, there is no reason to think that love is in principle precluded by morality. For if partiality is grounded in genuine reasons (to love), then morality need not be insensitive to the significance of partiality. Indeed, the moral idea that persons as such deserve not to be treated in certain ways only makes sense when we recognize the legitimacy of persons' partial concerns and attachments. Thus, morality and partiality are not merely compatible; they are complementary.

When the judge recuses herself because the defendant is her son, she does not fail in her role as a judge. On the contrary, she abides by her role as a judge by appropriately disqualifying herself from the case on the basis of the defendant's relevant features (namely, his being her son). After all, as I mentioned above, to save her son she could have resumed her role and ruled in his favor, thereby abusing her authority as a judge. But just as the judge's devotion to the execution of a fair trial is restricted by her devotion to her son, so her devotion to her son is restricted by her devotion to the execution of a fair trial. More generally, moral equality may be compatible with partiality if we can say something general and illuminating about when partiality is permissible or warranted and what are genuine reasons for assigning special significance to specific individuals. To be sure, I have not offered such an account here; I have only claimed that there is no general reason to believe that such an account cannot be provided.

## 2. A Puzzle about Particularity

In the previous section I argued that the puzzle of legitimate partiality arises when we fail to acknowledge the role of reasons *to* love. Even if loving another partially consists in taking oneself to have reasons *of* love, which refer to the beloved and not to his or her relevant properties, it is our reasons *to* love this individual that make sense of the fact that we have such reasons *of* love for him or her. As long as we have genuine reasons to love a person, favoring them in the relevant ways does not conflict with the equal moral worth of all persons.

But if the puzzle of legitimate partiality results from overlooking reasons *to* love, our next puzzle, the puzzle of love's particularity, arises from the opposite mistake: neglecting reasons *of* love. The puzzle of particularity begins with the thought that rational love must be grounded in the beloved's properties. The fact that Todd is kind and wise, or that he is my friend, makes sense of my love for him, of the things I do for him and the attitudes I take towards him. But when I help Todd move to a new apartment, for example, I do so out of concern for Todd, not out of concern for kindness, wisdom, or friendship. Insofar as I love Todd, my responses to him are primarily responses to him as the particular person he is. It might therefore seem that if love is rational it must be concerned with the beloved's relevant properties and that this is incompatible with genuine love, which is concerned with the beloved as the particular person he or she is.

In an attempt to clarify this peculiar puzzle, I would like to consider the way in which it emerges from our previous puzzle, the puzzle of legitimate partiality. I begin with an example offered by Charles Fried and famously picked up and criticized by Bernard Williams, of a man who chooses between rescuing his wife and rescuing a stranger from drowning. Fried arrives at the example through a discussion of resource allocation. He considers the question of why we should give priority of resources to actual and present sufferers over absent or future ones. He then offers an analogy: "Surely it would be absurd to insist that if a man could, at no risk or cost to himself, save one of two persons in equal peril, and one of those in peril was, say, his wife, he must treat both equally, perhaps by flipping a coin" (Fried 1970, 227).

Why does Fried think that coin tossing would be "absurd" in such a circumstance? Suppose the husband flips a coin and consequently rescues his wife rather than the stranger. Suppose further that he later justifies his decision to someone by enumerating the morally relevant considerations in favor of flipping a coin. Still we may ask the husband: "What about the fact that she is your wife, didn't this fact play any role in your decision?" Presumably, if the fact that the woman he saved is his wife played no role in the husband's decision, we would find it hard to believe that the husband loves his wife at all. It is absurd that a loving husband would act in such circumstances based solely on moral considerations.



Fried proposes a solution:

Where the potential rescuer occupies no office such as that of a captain of a ship, public health official or the like, the occurrence of the accident may itself stand as a sufficient randomizing event to meet the dictates of fairness, so he may prefer his friend, or loved one. Where the rescuer does occupy an official position, the argument that he must overlook personal ties is not unacceptable. (Ibid.)

According to Fried, space can be made for legitimate partiality toward one's wife by showing that partiality may have a legitimate moral function. In this way, moral demands do not eclipse the husband's love for his wife.

But to avoid the absurdity in question it is not enough to explain why it is permissible for the husband to rescue his wife; we must also explain why it would be inappropriate—perhaps even impermissible—for the husband to ignore the fact that the woman is his wife. The husband's attachment to his wife is not merely an emotional or attitudinal state that morality should allow; it is a normative relation to be understood in terms of the husband's reasons. That is why the husband may wrong his wife by treating her as if she were a stranger.

Thus, even if, in line with Fried's suggestion, the husband considered the fact the accident occurred as a randomizing event that renders rescuing his wife fair, the husband would seem oddly alienated from his wife. "It might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife)," Bernard Williams memorably noted, "that [the husband's] motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife" (Williams 1981, 18). The idea seems to be that a loving husband whose wife is in mortal danger cannot—indeed, ought not—take up an impartial point of view.

I have suggested that, contrary to Williams's claim, the question of permissibility is pertinent to the husband's choice. Granted, the husband should not ponder the issue and articulate his justification in the moment of action, but the issue is a real one nonetheless. That is, there is a real question about whom to rescue and how rescuing the wife might be justified to the stranger. Furthermore, it is arguable that cases like this one illustrate the authority of morality: morality draws us out of our particular point of view

in order that we recognize the particular points of view of others. Not only is it not an objection to impartial morality that it is in tension with the husband's love for his wife; this tension is precisely why morality must be insisted upon.

Still, I think the example and the objection Williams raises reveal more than the inherent tension between love and impartial morality. Williams's point is striking, not because it shows that complete commitment to morality involves inevitable alienation from one's loving relationships, but because it reveals a puzzle about the kind of significance we attribute to the people we love. What is it about the fact that the woman is the rescuer's wife that makes us shudder when he fails to mention this fact as his reason to save her? Or, put another way, why should the husband be inclined to save her "because she is his wife"?

As I already mentioned, one might not love one's wife, and even if one does love her, it seems odd that one should help her on the basis of one's marital status. A similar thought seems to lie behind Derek Parfit's remark (which Liam Murphy reports): "It's odd that Williams gives, as the thought that the person's wife might hope he was having, that he is saving her because she is his wife. She might have hoped that he saved her because she was Mary, or Jane, or whatever" (Murphy 2000, 140 n. 36). Admittedly, the very ending of Parfit's remark—"or whatever"—seems to undermine his point, but the idea is that for the husband to focus on his relationship to his wife is to risk being alienated from what ought to be the immediate object of his concern: namely her, Mary.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, it is not clear why the fact that the woman is Mary should provide the husband with a normative reason to rescue her rather than the stranger. Niko Kolodny argues that "[t]he thought that she is Mary simply identifies a particular with itself; it does not ascribe a property to that particular that might make a certain response to it appropriate. After all, the stranger left to drown might point out that he is Fred" (Kolodny, *Love as Valuing a Relationship* 2003, 159). Kolodny goes on to argue that if the fact that the woman is Mary is not a reason to save her, then it cannot be rationally motivating. Kolodny believes, like many others, that rational action is motivated by the

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<sup>5</sup> Here I draw on Kolodny's explanation of Parfit's point. See Kolodny (2003, 158).

agent's grasp of his or her normative reasons. Since rigidly individualized thoughts do not provide normative reasons, Kolodny concludes that the husband could not have been rationally motivated to save the woman "because she is Mary."

The problem seems to be the following. We have been assuming that the lover's reasons are like impartial reasons in that they universalize over all agents but pick out specific agents by their properties. Mary must have some property that gives the husband special reason to save her, a property that, in principle, could be instantiated by any agent, not only Mary. Whatever this property might be, it is in virtue of grasping the fact that Mary instantiates it that the husband should see himself as having special reason to save her and therefore be rationally motivated to save her.

Parfit's remark suggests that even the husband's recognition of such a property would be one thought too many. The current problem is not that morality is in tension with love; it is that rationality is in tension with love. To rescue your wife because she is your wife is already to be drawn away, or alienated, from one's particular point of view toward one's beloved. The husband might protest, for example, that unlike the person who takes the role of the judge and therefore acts in this capacity, he did not save Mary in the role of a husband who saves his wife or the role of a lover who saves his beloved. Mary's importance to him is not mediated by any general description that he and she meet. Put metaphorically, but adequately, I think, we might say that in rescuing Mary the husband acted as the person he is underneath all his roles and descriptions. And then we should add that he rescued Mary as the person she is underneath all her roles and descriptions. Hence the minimally informative thought: "It's her!"

To be sure, we need not hold that the husband rescues his wife as the "bare particular" she is underneath all her properties. A love for a bare particular is highly *impersonal*, for it involves none of the properties that account for the person's character. Rather, what we want to say is that the husband rescues his wife as the particular person she *actually* is, with all of the properties she actually has. What we deny is that in rescuing his wife the husband is concerned with the properties that render rescuing her appropriate.

Whether or not we agree with Parfit's point in this particular instance, it seems to reflect a powerful intuition, namely, that love involves valuing the beloved as the particular person he or she is rather than as a person who satisfies some relevant description or criterion that warrants love. And the question raised by Kolodny's resistance to this thought is this: How else are we to make sense of the particularity of love?

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The question of the particularity of love has been construed in different ways, a fact that, I believe, has led to some confusion. Joseph Raz, for example, thinks of the matter in terms of the beloved's irreplaceability:

There is (or was) something about the object [i.e., the beloved] which lends it value of a special kind, such that while some feasible replacements may be as good or even better, they will not be quite the same—not quite the same in what makes them good or valuable, and in the precise way that they are or were good or valuable. (Raz 2001, 25-26)

Raz assumes that if the beloved is irreplaceable, then there must be some property that renders the beloved unique in its value for the lover. Of course, the relationships we have with friends, siblings, parents, children, and lovers might be uniquely valuable as a matter of fact: there might be no one else, or it might be very unlikely that there will be someone else, with whom we can have a relationship that bears the same valuable properties (Raz 2001, 24). But what is needed, Raz believes, is an explanation of how a beloved might be in principle irreplaceable, not merely contingently irreplaceable. So *de facto uniqueness*, as Raz calls it, does not suffice for the irreplaceability characteristic of many loving relationships.

Raz's solution is to appeal to valuable properties that could only be instantiated once: "the first child was the parents' first, and that makes the attachment special, gives it a flavour no other can have for them" (Raz 2001, 27). There is necessarily only one person who gave me my first kiss, one person who is my oldest sister, etc. Raz believes *logical uniqueness*—i.e., the bearing of properties that are by definition satisfied only once by one particular—explains why, in love, we are often attached to a particular person that is in principle irreplaceable. The value of "historical properties," Raz says,

“can capture the sense in which what is uniquely valuable is the object—it is the object under the historical description: my first child, i.e., my child qua first child, etc.” (Raz 2001, 28 n. 14).

The last comment, about the uniqueness of one's first child, suggests that Raz's explanation misses the mark. For it seems highly implausible that the only thing that renders the parent's child irreplaceable is that she was their first child—as if without this historical property the child might have been replaceable. Reducing the unique value of the child to such an historical property is no different from reducing her unique value to some non-historical, repeatable property. For in either case we fail to account for the fact that it is *this* child that is uniquely valuable, not the properties she instantiates. Raz's account makes it seem as if what we really care about when we see our beloved as irreplaceable are the properties that make him or her so.

Raz rejects this interpretation of his view. He emphasizes that it is the beloved we love, not the features that make him or her valuable. But he says this is not enough to solve the problem of uniqueness, because we love this particular beloved for some reason or other. Raz concludes that since reasons are universal, we must offer a general feature that makes this particular beloved unique (Raz 2001, 28 n. 14).

But from the fact that we love this particular for some reason it does not follow that there must be something about this particular that no other particular has. The same feature that gives us reason to love Jane in particular might give us reason to love Oscar in particular. And the mere fact that both Jane and Oscar have this feature does not entail that one might be replaced by the other. After all, we love the particulars themselves, not their features. So the fact that other individuals who share our beloved's features are available elsewhere need not render our beloved replaceable. Similarly, even if our beloved is logically unique, to use Raz's phrase, it is *she* whom we value uniquely, not the historical property that makes her logically unique.

The confusion arises from the fact that we may have the very same reasons to love various different individuals. But in loving a person we recognize and act on a wide

range of reasons that are not our reasons *to* love her: they are our reasons *of* love for her. Unlike reasons *to* love, reasons *of* love essentially refer to a beloved *as a particular*. Raz's mistake, I believe, is that he assigns reasons *to* love the role properly assigned to reasons *of* love. That is to say, Raz attempts to rationally explain why we love a person uniquely by appealing to our unique reasons *to* love him or her—e.g., that she is my first child, my childhood friend, my first kiss, etc. However, we are normally justified in loving a person uniquely even when we have the very same reason to love another person. Reasons *of* love—not reasons *to* love—explain our love for particulars as such.

Raz is not alone in assigning reasons *to* love a task they are unfit to perform. Since the distinction between reasons *to* love someone and reasons *of* love for him or her has not been made explicit, philosophers have often been led to believe that when we have the same reason to love different persons we cannot rationally love each as an irreplaceable particular.<sup>6</sup> Before I consider why this distinction should be so elusive, I would like to examine two other examples that manifest philosophers' discomfort with general accounts of the significance of particular persons as such.

Niko Kolodny has developed a thoughtful and elaborate theory of love by examining the vulnerabilities of alternative theories. One such alternative theory is the quality theory. On this theory, our reasons for loving a person are constituted by his or her loveable qualities: his or her beauty, wit, sense of humor, etc. These are traits that warrant our love. One of the objections Kolodny raises against the quality theory is that it fails to account for the “nonsubstitutability” of the beloved:

If Jane's qualities are my reasons for loving her, then they are equally reasons for my loving anyone else with the same qualities. Insofar as my love for Jane is responsive to its reasons, therefore, it ought to accept anyone with the same qualities as a substitute. But an attitude that would accept just as well any Doppelgänger or swamp-Jane that happened along would scarcely count as love. (Kolodny 2003, 140-141)

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<sup>6</sup> Roger Lamb is an exception. Lamb calls out and denies the assumption that “if an attitude is universalizable, then its object is in some way a *universal!*” (Lamb 1997, 41-42, italics in original). Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson (1993, 9) and David Velleman (1999, 364) both draw on the Kantian distinction between price and dignity to explain how the capacity for valuing can explain the significance of particulars as such. Unlike things that have only a price, valuing beings have dignity: a valuing being can only be appropriately valued as irreplaceable and incomparable.

In contrast to the quality theory, Kolodny's own view, the relationship theory, holds that "my reason for loving Jane ... is my relationship to her: that she is my daughter, or my mother, or my sister, or my friend, or the woman with whom I have made my life" (Kolodny, *Love as Valuing a Relationship* 2003, 146). Furthermore, on this view, Kolodny's love for Jane partly consists in, and is causally sustained by, his recognition that his relationship to Jane renders his love appropriate.

Kolodny believes the relationship theory explains nonsubstitutability: twin-Jane would not warrant his love because she would not be the person with whom he made his life. And though Kolodny agrees that we might imagine a "relationship Doppelgänger," who has the same relational features as my beloved, he believes that in this case it is indeed appropriate to love the Doppelgänger:

If my wife and I decide to have a second child, for instance, then we bring into this world a relationship Doppelgänger to our first child. The relationship theory implies that we have just as much reason to love the second child as the first. But this is the right implication. (Kolodny, *Love as Valuing a Relationship* 2003, 147)

Though it is certainly plausible that Kolodny and his wife have just as much reason to love their second child as they have to love their first, it is utterly implausible that their second child may be substituted for their first. But if Kolodny's complaint against the quality theory is valid, then he is committed to the claim that his children are substitutable. Recall that, according to Kolodny, the quality theory fails to account for nonsubstitutability because it implies that Kolodny has the same reason to love Jane as he does to love twin-Jane: both Jane and twin-Jane are witty, kind, funny, etc. But Kolodny's own view implies that he has the same reason to love his second child as he does to love his first: both are his children. Kolodny is therefore similarly exposed to the objection of substitutability. But as we have seen from our discussion of Raz, the right response on behalf of both the relationship theory and the quality theory is that we may have the same reason *to* love different individuals as the particular persons they are and therefore have reasons *of* love not to substitute one for the other. From the fact that we

have the same reason to love two different individuals it does not follow that one may replace the other.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, consider Harry Frankfurt's view, which denies that there are reasons *to* love a particular person. Frankfurt takes the particularity of love as his primary starting point and observes, like Raz and Kolodny, that love involves a principled resistance to substitution: "Substituting some other object for the beloved is not an acceptable and perhaps not even an intelligible option" (Frankfurt, *On Caring* 1999, 166). Furthermore, Frankfurt holds that "a person cannot coherently accept a substitute for his beloved, even if he is certain that he would find himself loving the substitute just as much as he loves the beloved that it replaces" (Frankfurt, *On Caring* 1999, 169).

But unlike Kolodny and Raz, Frankfurt takes for granted that any account of love in terms of value or reasons would fail to do justice to the particularity of love. He argues that "the reason it makes no sense to consider replacing what we love with a substitute is not that loving something entails supposing that it is one of a kind" (Frankfurt, *On Caring* 1999, 169). Since Frankfurt assumes that reasons could only account for the beloved's irreplaceability if the beloved were "one of a kind," he concludes that any reasons- or value-based view of love would fail to capture the sense in which the beloved is irreplaceable. It is not anything about the beloved that renders him or her unique: "The focus of a person's love is not those general and hence repeatable characteristics that make his beloved describable. Rather, it is the specific particularity that makes his beloved nameable" (Frankfurt, *On Caring* 1999, 170).

These observations lead Frankfurt to the conclusion that love consists in a complex structure of desires, or, as he puts it, "a complex volitional structure that bears

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<sup>7</sup> Perhaps a more charitable interpretation of Kolodny's complaint against the quality theory is that the quality theory yields implausible conclusions about what facts constitute reasons to love, not that it is committed to the substitutability of the beloved. This interpretation would enable Kolodny to say, against the quality theorist, that it is implausible that I have the same reason to love twin-Jane, whom I just met, as I have to love Jane, with whom I made a life. Moreover, it is plausible that Kolodny has the same reason to love his second child as he does his first. But all this is besides the present point, which is that, like Raz, Kolodny slides back and forth between implicitly accepting and denying that general features of particular persons may account for our love for them as the particular persons they are.



both upon how a person is disposed to act and upon how he is disposed to manage the motivations and interests by which he is moved” (Frankfurt, *On Caring* 1999, 165). Frankfurt seems to think that desires, unlike values and reasons, can take particulars as such as their object. Desires therefore seem to him fit to explain the particularity of love.

But, as we have seen, from the fact that the object of love is the particular beloved as such it does not follow that love cannot be grounded in “those general and hence repeatable characteristics that make [the] beloved describable.” To say that my love for Yaara is warranted by her sensitivity, and wisdom, and passion for life and beauty, is not to say that if another person with these qualities came along she would render Yaara replaceable; nor is it to say that in loving Yaara I only pay attention to these qualities; nor is it to say that I love Yaara as a way of loving someone who has these qualities. To borrow a distinction offered by Kolodny, Yaara’s qualities may provide the *ground* of my love for her but it is Yaara who is the *focus* of my love (Kolodny, *Love as Valuing a Relationship* 2003, 154). There may be universal reasons for loving a particular person as such. Contrary to what Frankfurt seems to believe, and notwithstanding the many merits of his view, the particularity of love is compatible with the idea that love is responsive to reasons.

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One possible source of confusion about the particularity of love may be an implicit assumption about the content of the lover’s reasons—namely, that reasons to respond to the beloved must include the general features that render him or her an appropriate object of love. More specifically, the assumption is that for the beloved’s properties to be part of the rational explanation of the lover’s reasons, the beloved’s properties must be part of the lover’s reasons. This assumption leads to the implausible conclusion that the lover’s reason—for example, to act for the sake of the beloved—includes the properties that render love for the beloved appropriate. But this is not a plausible account of the content of reasons *of* love. What we want to say, instead, is that, as in the case of the husband who rescues his wife, the lover’s reasons are normally not given by the properties that make love appropriate, but by the beloved him- or herself, as well as the beloved’s relevant circumstances.

Fortunately, it has been argued that the assumption that yields the implausible consequence is false. Jonathan Dancy, for example, distinguishes between facts that favor an action and facts that enable other facts to favor an action (Dancy 2004, ch. 3); T. M. Scanlon distinguishes between a consideration that counts in favor of an action and the conditions under which the consideration counts in favor of an action (Scanlon 2014, ch. 2); and Mark Schroeder distinguishes between a reason for action and the background conditions in virtue of which a proposition counts as a reason for action (Schroeder 2007, ch. 2).

The idea is that there may be normative explanations of why we have the reasons we have that are not part of the reasons themselves. The fact that I pursue an academic career in philosophy is a condition for, or enabler of, my reason for writing an academic paper about the rationality of love. If I did not pursue an academic career in philosophy, I would not have had reason to write an academic paper about the rationality of love. But the fact that I pursue an academic career in philosophy is not itself a reason to write a paper about the rationality of love. Whether a person has a reason to perform a given action normally depends on certain background conditions, but these background conditions are not part of the agent's reason to perform the action.

It therefore seems possible to hold that not all the properties that explain the lover's reasons are part of those reasons. The husband's reason for rescuing Mary is simply that Mary is in mortal danger, but Mary's properties—e.g., her being his wife for the past 25 years—partly explain why the husband has this reason. The distinction between *reasons of love* and *reasons to love* may be understood along the lines of the distinction between reasons and background conditions, or favorers and enablers, to use Dancy's parlance. The properties that make love appropriate need not give the lover reasons *of love* with regard to the beloved, but they give the lover reasons *to love* and enable the lover's reasons *of love*. Admittedly, as we fall in love, or have a “crush,” we respond to the features of the person that warrant our love, to our reasons *to love* him or her. But once in love, the very same features recede to the background and resurface only in moments of reflection or conflict.

When the two kinds of love-related reasons are run together, love might seem preoccupied with its own appropriateness. Niko Kolodny, for example, believes that love

partly consists in the belief that some relationship renders it appropriate, and the emotions and motivations of love are causally sustained by this belief... Special concern for a person is not love at all when there is no belief that a relationship renders it appropriate. (Kolodny 2003, 146)

It seems to me that Kolodny's proposal does not do justice to the particularity of love. Even if Kolodny is right in holding that love is rendered appropriate by the kind of relationship one has with one's beloved—i.e., even if he's right that relationships give us reasons *to* love a particular person—it is implausible that special concern can only count as love if the agent believes that her love is made appropriate by her relationship with the beloved. It is not uncommon to love without knowing why, or how to make sense of it. For special concern to count as love it is sufficient that the agent takes herself to have reasons *of* love for the person toward whom the concern is directed: reasons to spend time with the person, to mind his or her thoughts and feelings, etc. If we come to believe that we lack reasons *to* love, or that we have reasons *not to* love, then we might reassess our reasons *of* love, or face a genuine conflict between reasons that pull us in opposite directions. But the question of the appropriateness of our love for a particular person might not arise, and we may therefore not have a clear view about the matter, even as we are deeply in love.

Kolodny's claim that what sustains love is primarily a belief in its appropriateness also seems inaccurate. Just as we might be troubled by the impression that our love is rationally criticizable, or objectionable, or that it does not make sense, so our love might compel us to reassess our views about whom it is rational to love. This is not to deny that our beliefs about appropriateness are part of what sustains our love, but to point out that our love is part of what sustains our beliefs about appropriateness: the two are in reflective equilibrium.

Furthermore, love is often appropriately oblivious to the question of its own appropriateness, as illustrated by the case of the husband who rescues his wife without thinking. And even when a person recognizes that she has very strong reasons, or

decisive reason, to love someone, it would be odd if her love depended on this belief. Indeed, contrary to Kolodny's contention, I suspect that a love that relies on its appropriateness to survive is no love at all.

### 3. A Puzzle about Necessity

We have thus far dealt with two puzzles about the rationality of love. With regard to the puzzle of legitimate partiality, we saw that if there are genuine reasons to love, then the actions and motivations of love need not be objectionably arbitrary or conflict with morality. In considering the puzzle of love's particularity, we saw that our reasons to love a particular person are not the reasons we primarily respond to in loving them. Our reasons, e.g., to mind the beloved's feelings, to consult in him or her, to act for the beloved's sake, and to spend time together, are reasons *of* love. Reasons *of* love refer to the beloved as a particular, not merely as a person we have reasons *to* love. The particularity of love is thus salvaged by the distinction between two kinds of love-related reasons.

But a significant challenge remains. Consider the following question: does it follow from the fact that I have reason to love a person that I am required to love her? A positive answer would seem more plausible in the case of familial love than in the case of friendship or romantic love. The fact that a child is my daughter may be said to give me conclusive reason to love her. But in the case of friendship or romantic love, love seems essentially optional: having reasons to love someone as a friend or lover does not imply that it would be inappropriate or rationally criticizable not to. Love may often be rationally permissible but not required.<sup>8</sup>

That love and the actions done from love may be optional in this way would not have seemed puzzling if it weren't for the fact that in loving a person we see our emotions, as well as many of our actions, as called for or required. The beloved's good, his or her thoughts, feelings, and concerns, carry significant weight in our deliberation and play an important motivating role in our lives. And though love certainly involves

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<sup>8</sup> For example, Troy Jollimore (2011, 138) argues that reasons to love make love "rationally eligible" but never rationally obligatory.

more than positive feelings, and may often inspire annoyance, anger, and even rage, love always assigns a special authority to the beloved without which neither our happiness nor our anguish make sense.<sup>9</sup> The problem is that the fact that love is peremptory seems compatible with the idea that often love is not rationally required. Oddly, the emotions of love, and the actions and reactions to which they give rise, appear to be both required and optional. This is the puzzle about *the necessity of love*.

It seems plausible that the two kinds of love-related reasons we have been discussing correspond to the optional and necessary aspects of love: the optionality of love is accounted for by reasons *to* love, while the necessity of love is explained by reasons *of* love. Since we can have reasons *to* love someone without having reasons *of* love for him or her, love may be optional. But when we have reasons *of* love for someone, love is peremptory.

I think this is the right thing to say here, but it is not enough in order to disarm the puzzle about love's necessity. For we must explain how there could be reasons *to* love a person but no reasons *of* love with regard to him or her. The worry is that if reasons *of* love *follow* from reasons *to* love, then we have reasons *of* love with regard to anyone we have reasons *to* love. But the proposed account of love's necessity turns on the possibility that we can have reasons *to* love a person without having reasons *of* love with regard to him or her. So in order to address the puzzle of love's necessity, it is not enough to draw the distinction between the two kinds of love-related reasons—we must also say something about the relation between them.

We may begin to do this by noting that love is not alone in its predicament of “optional necessity.” Promising, too, is optional in one sense and necessary in another:

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<sup>9</sup> David Velleman complains that recent accounts of love in analytic philosophy “express a sentimental fantasy” in which “love necessarily entails a desire to ‘care and share,’ or to ‘benefit and be with’. But,” says Velleman, “it is easy enough to love someone whom one cannot stand to be with” (Velleman 1999, 353). In agreement with Velleman’s general observation, I would add that while our feelings and attitudes toward people we love can range from rage and anger to warmth and affection, the one attitude we cannot take toward our beloveds is indifference. This is why, when faced with a choice between being hated and being ignored, more often than not people choose the former. Anonymity might seem worse than notoriety.

making a promise is optional, but keeping it is not.<sup>10</sup> Just as we have reasons *to* love and reasons *of* love, we may be said to have reasons *to* promise and reasons *of* promise. Like reasons *to* love, reasons *to* promise are general and often optional, and like reasons *of* love, reasons *of* promise refer to particulars as such and are peremptory. It might therefore be suggested either that we promise to love or that love is a kind of promise. This would explain why we have optional reasons *to* love, but peremptory reasons *of* love.

But while it is certainly true that loving a person normally involves making promises to him or her, and that such promises might further and deepen our love, I do not believe that the necessity of love can be appropriately construed as the binding force of a promise. Promises are only binding when they are made voluntarily, but love is often involuntary. And, unlike in the case of promising, even when one acknowledges the involuntariness of one's love, this does not diminish the apparent force of one's reasons *of* love.

A second answer to the puzzle of love's necessity avoids claims about the voluntariness of love and insists that reasons *of* love do follow from reasons *to* love. It may be argued that while a person has some reason to love almost anyone, she has overall, or decisive, reason to love only a few. Some facts or considerations may count in favor of loving a person and yet be outweighed or defeated by other facts or considerations. In contrast, when we have decisive reason to love, all the relevant considerations have already been taken into account and the final verdict requires our love. On this proposal, then, we have *reasons of love* only with regard to the few individuals whom we have *decisive reason to love*. What makes love seem optional, on this account, is that we normally have reasons to love without those reasons amounting to *decisive reason to love*, and therefore without having reasons *of* love.

My main worry about this proposal is that it is implausible that we are rationally *required* to love the persons who are our friends or romantic partners. No matter how wonderful someone might be, no matter how loving and caring, even if you enjoy this

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<sup>10</sup> I thank Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc for this point.

person's company, find him or her interesting, attractive, and trustworthy, and you have a long, wonderful history with him or her, you may not take yourself to have reasons of love with regard to this person. And I do not think it is plausible to say that you would thereby be open to rational criticism for failing to recognize your reasons *of* love. For you might simply not have reasons of love with regard to this highly loveable person. It may be rationally permissible not to love him or her: sometimes love is not forthcoming and that is all there is to it.

A third proposal might seem more plausible. It may be argued that while we may not be rationally required to love a person, once we actually love someone, and have reasons *to* love this person, then we have further reasons *of* love with regard to him or her. Love would then consist of a set of attitudes, motivations, and emotions that take a particular person as their object and, in the appropriate conditions, give rise to a wide range of reasons with regard to the beloved. Like the promise-based account, this proposal also appeals to a fact about the agent that triggers reasons of love; but it does not rely on love's voluntariness. The idea, then, is that the emotions, attitudes, and actions of love are optional before the fact of love and non-optional once love is in place.

But such an explanation of reasons *of* love puts the cart before the horse, so to speak. For no behavior, psychological state, sensation, or disposition can count as love unless it reflects the agent's judgment that she (already) has reasons *of* love with regard to the particular beloved.<sup>11</sup> We might put the point by saying that in loving a person we normally see ourselves as answerable to him or her in particular. That is to say, loving someone involves taking that person to have a kind of entitlement to make certain demands on us and to hold ourselves accountable for not meeting certain expectations. We are answerable in different ways to our lovers, friends, parents, children, and siblings. There are many (many) things that we do not share with our children or that even our very good friends do not know about us, but we are still answerable to our children and friends in the ways that are relevant to our love for them. No matter how we feel about a

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<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Setiya (2014, 269) claims that one's love is partly constituted by one's propensity to recognize certain reasons, by one's attentiveness to certain facts about one's circumstance, and by one's responsiveness to these reasons and facts.

person, if we do not see him or her as significant to us in this peculiar way—if we do not see ourselves as somehow bound up in the person's particular point of view—we do not love the person. But if we count as loving a person in virtue of seeing him or her as authoritative—i.e., in virtue of taking ourselves to have reasons of love with respect to the person—then our love cannot *explain* the beloved's authority and our reasons of love.<sup>12</sup>

The foregoing observation suggests that our reasons *to* love another, and our inclination toward loving him or her, are not sufficient to give rise to reasons *of* love. It seems to me that in order to find the missing ingredient that explains reasons *of* love, we should look, not at the lover, but at the beloved. Whether a person has the authority characteristic of a beloved depends not only on our emotions and attitudes toward him or her and our reasons to have those emotions and attitudes, but also on the emotions and attitudes of our would-be beloved. Our reasons *to* love may provide a rational basis for wishing that the other person would see us as his or her beloved. But only if the other person in fact reciprocates our plea and accepts the authority we wish to grant him or her, do we have reasons *of* love with regard to this person. And while a person can only have reasons *of* love with regard to another if she also has reasons *to* love him or her, her reasons *of* love crucially depend on the beloved's uptake.<sup>13</sup> As such, reasons *of* love entail reasons *to* love but are not entailed by them, for they are essentially inter-subjective. This is the thesis about *the inter-subjectivity of reasons of love*: they are reasons that depend not only on reasons to love, but on reciprocal willingness to love.

It follows from this thesis that even when we have reasons *to* love that rationally permit but do not require our love, we may have reasons *of* love due to our beloved's stance towards us. Such a predicament explains why it makes sense to experience oneself

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<sup>12</sup> There's a wrinkle here. We can see our beloveds as authoritative independently of whether they are in fact authoritative. So it may be argued that love is constituted by the fact that a person sees another as authoritative in the relevant way and that seeing someone as authoritative *makes* that person authoritative. Love may therefore explain reasons *of* love. But it would follow from such an explanation that there could be no justification for taking oneself to have reasons *of* love other than that one already takes oneself to have reasons *of* love. And this seems odd, to say the least.

<sup>13</sup> The solution I propose here is akin to the promise-based solution insofar as promises, too, require uptake on behalf of the promisee. But, in contrast to the promise-based solution, on the solution I am proposing neither the offering of love nor its acceptance need to be voluntary.



as failing to appropriately love a person even when one is not rationally required to love him or her. For example, you might feel that you are drifting away from a friend, or a lover, but that you should continue to love him or her. Perhaps one day, out of the blue, you find yourself unmoved by your beloved's sadness. Or your beloved tells you how they feel about you, that you are their dearest friend, or that they never felt so close to someone, and you realize that you cannot truthfully say the same about them. And when you realize this you may very well acknowledge that there are others whom it would make sense for you to love—i.e., that there are other loves you may rationally pursue instead—and that by ceasing to love this person you would not be violating any promise you made to him or her. You may realize that you are not generally required to love this person. And yet you may be determined to resist the undoing of your love, due to your beloved's authority, due to your reasons *of* love. The beloved may seem to have a claim to your love, and you may seem to remain answerable to him or her, even if your attitudes and emotions pull you away and toward someone else.

The opposite might happen, too. You may wish not to love someone anymore, and vigorously pursue other relationships or friendships that you have reason to pursue. And yet later—maybe years later—you may come to realize that all along you have been failing to acknowledge that the person you left behind is important to you. Perhaps you have ceased to love that person and haven't given them much thought over the years. Perhaps you made the right decision overall in moving on. But now, as you are reminded of your old beloved, you realize that in navigating your love away from him or her you incurred a loss: you acted against your reasons *of* love.

In Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* we find a poignant example of the way a person may come to recognize his or her reasons of love long after the feelings of love have dwindled or grown numb. The narrator has scarcely mourned his grandmother's death, but more than a year later the pain of grief suddenly overwhelms him:

I clung to this pain, cruel as it was, with all my strength, for I realized that it was the effect of the memory I had of my grandmother, the proof that this memory was indeed present within me. I felt that I did not really remember her except through pain, and I longed for the nails that riveted her to my consciousness to be driven yet deeper. I did not try to mitigate my suffering, to embellish it, to pretend that my grandmother was only

somewhere else and momentarily invisible... Never did I do this, for I was determined not merely to suffer, but to respect the original form of my suffering as it had suddenly come upon me unawares, and I wanted to continue to feel it, *following its own laws*, whenever that contradiction of survival and annihilation, so strangely intertwined within me, returned. (Proust 1938/1999, 215, my italics)

Suffering has the authority of law in Proust's depiction of bereavement. The narrator's suffering derives its authority from being an expression of his grandmother—of her presence and existence. Grief descends upon us when we feel, all at once, the authority of the lost-beloved and its absence; the “contradiction of survival and annihilation.” In the depths of grief, the possibility that our pain will subside, that we will be able to do without our beloved, seems like a second killing, both of our beloved and of the person we were when we were with him or her. Living on without this person may seem as a denial of their particular authority, of their indispensability to us, and therefore as an admission that, all along, we were able to do without him or her. And even if we have most reason to move on, to accept our beloved's absence, we also have reason never to let go of the vivid memories and the inevitable pain that accompanies them. These memories and pain function as a fragile vessel through which our long gone beloved remains present. That there are often reasons—albeit, desperate reasons—to hold on to those we loved, and that these reasons have a crucial role in a lover's grief, suggests that the attitudes, motivations, and emotions of love reflect judgments about reasons *of* love.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, if I love Yaara then I see myself as answerable in relevant ways to her as she actually is. The fact that I recognize that it would have been rationally permissible for me not to love her, or to love someone else instead, does not settle the question: Am I answerable to Yaara? And I cannot settle this question by asking: Do I love Yaara? For my answer to the latter question is at least partly determined by my answer to the former: I love a person only if I take myself to have reasons *of* love with regard to him or her. If I appropriately see myself as answerable to Yaara, this is because Yaara accepts my wish to love her, and reciprocates it.

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<sup>14</sup> In “The Rational Significance of Regret,” I develop an account of rational regret along these lines. I argue that regret and a sense of loss are warranted by reasons of attachment to which we failed to respond.

We have considered different ways of construing the relation between reasons *to* love and reasons *of* love so as to explain the sense in which love is both optional and necessary. One solution maintains that loving is akin to promising, or to promising one's love. On this account, love is optional before its promise and non-optional after. Another solution holds that when a person has decisive reason *to* love another, she has reasons *of* love with regard to him or her. Love would then seem optional when we have *some* reason to love that does not amount to *decisive reason* to love. The third proposal distinguishes between optional reasons *to* love before the fact of love and non-optional reasons *of* love after the fact of love. Once we love someone appropriately, this proposal maintains, we have reasons *of* love with regard to him or her.

My own solution to the puzzle of love's necessity distinguishes between the optionality of reasons *to* love and the non-optionality of reasons *of* love. I have suggested that the fact that we have reasons to love someone and that we wish to love this person cannot settle the question of whether we have reasons *of* love with regard to him or her. Our reasons *of* love do not only depend on our reasons *to* love and our wish to love, but also depend on the corresponding attitude of our beloved. I have reasons of love with regard to Yaara partly in virtue of *Yaara's acceptance* of the authority I wish to grant her, partly in virtue of *my wish* to grant her such authority, and partly in virtue of *my reasons to* grant her such authority. From the point of view of my reasons *of* love for her, my love is peremptory, but from the point of view of my reasons *to* love Yaara, my love is merely permissible. There are general facts about the conditions in which it is rationally appropriate or even required to love another. But whatever those conditions are, the normativity of love does not follow from them, for it concerns the authority of actual, particular individuals considered as such. Digestion concerns nothing of the sort.

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